Europe and Kyiv ignored CIA director’s warnings of Putin’s impending Ukraine invasion

WASHINGTON — U.S. and British intelligence agencies achieved a "spectacular" success by accurately forecasting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though they fundamentally misjudged the strength of Ukrainian resistance, according to a new account based on interviews with more than 100 officials.

The report details how President Joe Biden dispatched CIA Director William Burns to Moscow in November 2021 to warn Vladimir Putin of catastrophic consequences if Russia moved forward with an attack. The mission was prompted by U.S. intelligence indicating a strike was imminent.

During a phone call at the time, Putin reportedly brushed aside the warnings and instead expressed paranoia regarding military threats from the United States. Following the trip, Burns informed President Biden of his certainty that Putin would order an invasion.

The conflict began three and a half months later.

Despite the accurate forecast of the invasion itself, the intelligence agencies faced significant shortcomings. Analysts incorrectly assumed Russia would achieve a quick victory and failed to anticipate the effectiveness of Ukraine's defense.

Furthermore, the warnings struggled to gain traction among international partners. European allies and the Ukrainian government remained skeptical, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissing the intelligence as fear-mongering until just days before the war began.

Four years after the invasion of Ukraine, the conflict serves as a definitive case study in the intelligence paradox: the chasm between gathering accurate data and convincing political leaders to act upon it. While the CIA and MI6 secured a rare tactical victory by correctly forecasting Vladimir Putin’s intentions, that achievement remains overshadowed by two systemic analytical failures.

The first was a failure of persuasion among Western allies. The shadow of the 2003 invasion of Iraq—justified by flawed intelligence—loomed large, fostering deep-seated skepticism within European intelligence circles. Many continental agencies dismissed the prospect of a full-scale land war in Europe as an "irrational" anachronism, incompatible with the 21st century. This diplomatic friction underscores a critical policy lesson: trust between allies is not an inherent default, but a fragile resource. The legacy of past intelligence errors can compromise collective security for decades, regardless of how accurate current data may be.

The second failure involved a fundamental miscalculation of Ukraine’s defensive capacity and national resolve. Western analysts over-indexed on Russia’s quantitative "paper strength"—counting tanks, aircraft, and battalion tactical groups—while discounting the human element. By ignoring the sociopolitical dynamics and the depth of Ukrainian nationalism, the West nearly missed the reality of the country's will to fight.

Ultimately, the invasion demonstrates that intelligence analysis must transcend the mere tallying of military hardware. It requires a sophisticated understanding of cultural and social drivers. The Ukraine experience serves as a stark warning to policymakers: the most dangerous intelligence failure is the refusal to prepare for a scenario simply because it appears "irrational" by Western standards.

While this doesn’t directly impact remittances or the day-to-day operations of phở restaurants and the nail salon industry in Little Saigon, nor does it change the status of F2B, H-1B, TPS, or EB-5 visa categories, it serves as a sobering reminder of geopolitical instability. We must remain vigilant against threats, even when they seem remote or far-fetched. For a community whose history is rooted in major upheaval, the lesson remains clear: accurate information and preparation are often a matter of survival.