USDA ordered to investigate international scientific partners, sparking 'new McCarthyism' fears

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration has directed U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) employees to investigate foreign scientists collaborating on research projects for evidence of "subversive or criminal activity."

The new directive requires staff to perform Google background checks on all foreign nationals working alongside the department's scientists. Names of individuals flagged during the process are then forwarded to the agency's national security experts.

Some USDA employees have expressed discomfort with the mandate, labeling the requirement "dystopian." Jennifer Jones, a director at the Union of Concerned Scientists, called the directive a "return to McCarthyism" and a "classic sign of authoritarianism."

The policy prohibits USDA researchers from co-publishing work with scientists from "countries of concern," including China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba. However, the mandate also subjects scientists from allied nations, such as Canada and Germany, to the screening process.

The USDA stated the changes are intended to implement a memorandum from President Trump’s first term aimed at protecting research funded by the United States.

A new directive from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) marks a significant escalation in the Trump administration’s broader effort to securitize the domestic scientific research landscape. Moving beyond targeted measures against traditional adversaries like China, the policy creates a climate of pervasive suspicion that threatens the foundations of international scientific cooperation. By mandating that scientists conduct ad hoc open-source vetting of their peers—essentially requiring researchers to "Google" their collaborators—the USDA has introduced a methodologically crude approach that invites arbitrary bias and risks a profound "chilling effect" across the academic and federal research communities.

While the USDA justifies these measures by citing historical instances of agricultural espionage, the policy’s expansive scope suggests a fundamental shift in posture. The inclusion of researchers from close allies, such as Canada and Germany, indicates an institutionalized distrust of foreign involvement that transcends traditional geopolitical boundaries. Such a move risks eroding the United States’ own scientific primacy; as the regulatory burden grows, domestic researchers may find it increasingly difficult to engage with the global talent pool necessary for high-level innovation.

For Vietnam, the implications are nuanced but carry significant operational risk. Although Vietnam is not officially designated as a "country of concern," the policy introduces a layer of regulatory ambiguity that could translate into heightened scrutiny for Vietnamese scientists, doctoral candidates, and students working within USDA-affiliated institutes. For a nation where agriculture remains a strategic economic pillar, any disruption to knowledge exchange or collaborative research with U.S. partners could have long-term developmental consequences. Ultimately, the policy’s broad reach and lack of procedural clarity pose a latent threat to international partners who now find themselves caught in the dragnet of American research security.

This directive poses a direct threat to the Vietnamese academic and scientific community in the U.S., particularly those navigating the complexities of H-1B visas or holding green cards. As highlighted, these researchers and students represent a segment of our diaspora that is uniquely vulnerable to shifting national security protocols. This pervasive climate of suspicion risks creating an invisible barrier to their career advancement, even for those whose work falls outside the immediate scope of the USDA. Ultimately, it reflects a broader administration trend toward heightened scrutiny of foreign nationals in sensitive fields, potentially chilling the professional growth of our community’s brightest minds.