Myanmar holds second phase of elections as heavy fighting rages

YANGON, Myanmar — Voters in Myanmar headed to the polls Sunday for the second phase of a military-managed election that critics have widely denounced as a sham.

The military-backed party is expected to dominate the vote as the ruling junta reportedly seeks to obscure low turnout figures from the first round.

Polling stations opened at 6 a.m. across 100 townships, including the regions of Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay, as well as Mon, Shan, and Kachin states. Many of these areas have experienced recent clashes or remain under heavy security.

Authorities structured the election into three phases because of ongoing armed conflict throughout the country. The first round took place Dec. 28 in 102 of Myanmar’s 330 townships.

The final stage of voting is scheduled for Jan. 25. However, officials said 65 townships will not participate in the election due to active fighting.

The Myanmar military junta’s decision to conduct elections in phases is a transparent attempt to manufacture a veneer of constitutional legitimacy following its 2021 coup. However, the logistical necessity of splitting the vote into three stages—and the outright exclusion of 65 townships—serves as a stark admission of Naypyidaw’s failure to exercise territorial sovereignty. The underwhelming turnout in the initial round, which state media has attempted to downplay, stands as a clear referendum on the public’s rejection of the process and a profound lack of trust in the military’s transition roadmap.

This electoral gambit places ASEAN members, particularly Vietnam, in an increasingly fraught diplomatic quandary. Hanoi remains anchored to the bloc’s foundational principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Yet, an election widely dismissed by the international community as a sham, coupled with Myanmar’s descent into a protracted civil war, continues to erode ASEAN’s collective credibility and institutional unity.

For Vietnam, an unstable Myanmar on its western periphery represents a significant geopolitical risk. Consequently, Hanoi is expected to maintain a posture of "principled caution." While the Vietnamese leadership will likely avoid inflammatory rhetoric that could breach diplomatic norms, it is equally unlikely to offer a full endorsement of an electoral process that so clearly lacks democratic mandate or domestic consensus.

For many in the Vietnamese-American community, a staged election held amidst the conflict in Myanmar may stir memories of the similarly unfree political landscape in Vietnam. Despite these historical parallels, the situation has no direct bearing on the community’s core interests. The business of nail salons and phở restaurants in Little Saigon, the flow of remittances, and visa processing for categories such as F2B, H-1B, TPS, and EB-5 remain entirely unaffected by these developments.