Introduction: A Death and 252 Fiery Barricades
On February 22, 2026, the Mexican military killed Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes — known as 'El Mencho' — the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the planet's most brutal and powerful drug trafficking organizations. He was wounded during a raid in the town of Tapalpa, Jalisco state, and died en route to Mexico City by helicopter.
But the death of a drug lord is never just the end of one story. It is the beginning of many others. Within hours of the operation, 252 roadblocks involving burning vehicles and barricades erupted across Mexico — from Jalisco, Michoacán, and Tamaulipas to Guanajuato and Aguascalientes. 25 National Guard members were killed in six separate attacks in Jalisco. Puerto Vallarta, a famous international tourist destination, was engulfed in black smoke. Passengers scattered in chaos at Guadalajara airport — Mexico's second-largest city and a venue scheduled to host World Cup 2026 matches just months away.
Who is "El Mencho" and Why Was He So Important?
To understand the scale of this event, one must look at the size of the CJNG. This cartel was co-founded by Oseguera Cervantes and Érick Valencia Salazar (alias "El 85") around 2007, from the remnants of the Milenio Cartel. Under El Mencho's leadership, CJNG grew at a rapid pace, becoming a direct rival to the Sinaloa Cartel — an organization that once dominated cross-border drug trafficking under "El Chapo" Guzmán and "El Mayo" Zambada.
CJNG is known for three characteristics: extreme violence, tactical innovation, and a massive volume of fentanyl. They were pioneers in attaching explosives to drones for attacks, planting landmines on roads, and once even shot down a military helicopter. In 2020, CJNG carried out an assassination attempt in the heart of Mexico City targeting the capital's police chief with grenades and heavy assault rifles — a display of power that shocked the entire nation.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, CJNG is the largest supplier of fentanyl to the U.S. market. Fentanyl — a synthetic opioid 50 times more potent than heroin — killed over 70,000 Americans annually during its peak period from 2021-2023, and this number only slightly decreased in 2024-2025. When Mike Vigil, former Chief of International Operations for the DEA, called this operation "one of the most important actions in the history of drug trafficking," he was not exaggerating.
But history also teaches us that eliminating a leader rarely destroys the organization.
The "King is Dead, Long Live the King" Effect: Lessons from El Chapo and Pablo Escobar
People often compare drug lord elimination campaigns to cutting off a snake's head. But Mexican cartels are not snakes — they are more like hydras. When El Chapo was last arrested in 2016 and extradited to the U.S. in 2017, the Sinaloa Cartel did not collapse. It fragmented into rival factions, leading to increased violence in many states. When "El Mayo" Zambada was brought to the U.S. in early 2025, the internal Sinaloa war erupted even more fiercely.
Going further back, the elimination of Pablo Escobar in Colombia in 1993 did not end cocaine trafficking — it merely dispersed power from one large cartel to dozens of smaller, harder-to-control groups.
With CJNG, a fragmentation scenario is entirely possible. The central question is: who will succeed him? Valencia Salazar, co-founder, was arrested and transferred to the U.S. in February 2025. El Mencho's son, Rubén Oseguera González (alias "El Menchito"), was arrested in 2014 and extradited to the U.S. in 2020. His daughter, Jessica Johanna Oseguera González, was convicted in the U.S. in 2022 for financial transactions related to the cartel.
In other words, CJNG's highest-level leadership has been almost completely wiped out. This could lead to two scenarios: either a mid-level figure quickly consolidates power (and violence temporarily decreases), or — more likely — multiple factions will vie for territory, and Mexico will experience a prolonged period of violence similar to that after El Chapo's arrest.
CJNG's immediate reaction — 252 roadblocks, 25 National Guard members killed in one day — shows that the organization still possesses significant operational capacity at the tactical level, even without its strategic head.
World Cup 2026: The Specter of Violence Over the Football Festival
One unignorable timing factor: the 2026 World Cup will take place in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada starting in June. Guadalajara — the capital of Jalisco, where burning vehicles blocked roads immediately after the operation — is one of the host cities. The Akron Stadium there is scheduled to host several group stage matches.
FIFA and the organizing committee now face a difficult question: will Guadalajara be safe for hundreds of thousands of international visitors just four months from now? If violence quickly subsides — as has happened after previous crackdowns — the issue might be contained. But if the succession struggle within CJNG turns Jalisco into a battleground, pressure to move matches to other venues will increase.
For Mexico's tourism industry — which contributes about 8.5% of its GDP — any disruption to the World Cup would be an economic disaster. Puerto Vallarta, where taxi and ride-hailing services were suspended, welcomes about 6 million tourists annually, mostly from the U.S. and Canada. Images of smoke rising from this coastal city circulating on social media will cause longer-lasting damage than any fiery barricade.
Strategic Analysis: The "Kingpin Strategy" — Effective or Illusion?
The "Kingpin Strategy" has been a cornerstone of U.S. and Mexican anti-drug efforts for the past two decades. The logic is simple: remove the leader to weaken the organization. But empirical evidence tells a different story.
A 2023 Stanford University study analyzed 65 arrests or killings of cartel leaders from 2006 to 2022, concluding that in 60% of cases, violence in the cartel's operational areas increased in the subsequent 12 months, due to internal power struggles and challenges from rivals. Only in about 25% of cases did violence sustainably decrease — typically when the elimination of a leader was accompanied by campaigns to dismantle financial and logistical networks.
The core problem that the Kingpin Strategy fails to address: demand. As long as the U.S. market consumes fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine at current levels, there will always be people willing to risk death for massive profits. CJNG has estimated revenues of $20 to $35 billion annually — a figure large enough to attract anyone to fill the void left by El Mencho.
Conclusion: A Tactical Victory, Not a Strategic One
El Mencho's death is a significant intelligence and military achievement. It shows that US-Mexico cooperation has been restored to a significant degree under Sheinbaum, and that Mexican armed forces are capable of carrying out complex operations with full intelligence support.
But calling this a "victory" in the broader sense would be premature. 25 National Guard members dead in one day. 252 roadblocks nationwide. International flights suspended. Tourists in panic. And all within 24 hours.
The coming weeks and months will determine whether this is a real turning point or just another chapter in Mexico's seemingly endless drug war.