Opening: When threats become reality
On March 10, 2026, the world is witnessing one of the most serious energy crises since the 1973 oil shock. Iran — after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in coordinated US-Israeli airstrikes — not only did not collapse as many Western policymakers expected, but instead escalated by blockading the Strait of Hormuz and attacking oil infrastructure of neighboring Gulf states.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared that it "will not allow a single liter of oil to be exported from the region" until the war ends on Tehran's terms. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated bluntly on PBS News that diplomacy with Washington "is no longer on Iran's agenda." This is not mere rhetoric — this is a calculated strategy, and it is sending shockwaves through nail salons in Houston, pho restaurants in Little Saigon, and families sending remittances to Vietnam.
Strategic context: Why the Strait of Hormuz is the "valve" of the global economy
To understand the severity of the situation, one must look at geography. The Strait of Hormuz, only about 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, is a shipping lane through which nearly 20% of the world's crude oil must pass — equivalent to approximately 17-18 million barrels per day under normal conditions. The world's largest oil-exporting countries — Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar — all depend on this route.
Iran has threatened to close Hormuz many times in the past: in 2012 amid tensions over its nuclear program, in 2018 when Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, and in 2019 following attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities. But this time is different. Tehran is in a state of actual war, the Supreme Leader has been killed, and the regime has nothing to lose by maintaining a hardline stance.
The IRGC's attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain — two countries not directly engaged in combat but viewed by Tehran as "allies of the enemy" — demonstrate the "escalation dominance" strategy that military analysts have long warned about. Iran is turning the entire Gulf into a battlefield, forcing the international community to confront enormous economic costs.
Game of power: Trump, Khamenei Jr., and Netanyahu
The three central figures in this conflict are each playing their own domestic political games, making the prospect of de-escalation extremely fragile.
Donald Trump is attempting to control the narrative by claiming the war "will end soon" and the US "has won in many ways." This tactic serves two purposes: reassure financial markets (oil prices did actually fall after his statement) and position himself as a "strong but restrained" president. However, immediately afterward, Trump posted on social media threatening to turn Iran into a country that "can never be rebuilt" — "Death, Fire, and Fury" — a classic contradiction between diplomacy and provocation. This is Trump's familiar style: tell Wall Street everything is fine while telling his base he will show no restraint.
Notably, Trump said he called Russian President Vladimir Putin and would exempt certain oil sanctions — almost certainly to have Russia increase production to compensate for the Gulf supply shortage. This is a significant strategic concession to Moscow with long-term implications for the global balance of power.
Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the slain leader, is in an extremely precarious position. He inherited power under unprecedented circumstances — his father killed by enemies, his nation under bombardment — and must prove toughness to consolidate legitimacy. Retaining Foreign Minister Araghchi shows a degree of institutional continuity, but the "no negotiations" declaration actually reflects strategic stalemate: Iran is not strong enough to win but cannot appear weak.
Benjamin Netanyahu — speaking from the National Medical Command Center, suggesting Israel is also sustaining losses — called on the Iranian people to "overthrow tyranny." This is the most blatant regime-change language an Israeli leader has used publicly. The statement "we are breaking their backbone" is not diplomacy — it is psychological warfare, and it will make any de-escalation from Iran far more difficult.
Economic domino effect: From $100 per barrel to dining tables in Little Saigon
Oil prices crossed the psychological $100/barrel threshold on Monday — rising as much as 30% in a day before falling again after Trump's statement. But this price decline is temporary and based on expectations that Tehran has immediately rejected. European natural gas prices fell 15% when trading opened after Trump's statement, but if the Strait of Hormuz remains blockaded, upward pressure will quickly return.
For the Vietnamese-American community, this economic effect ripples through multiple channels:
Gasoline prices and small business operating costs: Vietnamese-Americans own an unusually high proportion of small businesses — from nail salons, restaurants, to department stores. According to Small Business Administration data, Vietnamese-Americans have business ownership rates nearly double the national average for immigrant groups. Rising gas prices mean increased transportation costs for goods, employee and customer travel all increase. A nail salon owner in Houston or Garden Grove will feel it directly when customers cut back on spending for "luxury" services like nail care because they need more money for gas and food.
Import inflation and supply chains: Vietnam, a major exporting country to the US and a large energy importer, will face a double impact. Rising oil prices push manufacturing costs in Vietnam higher, making exported goods to the US more expensive. Simultaneously, inflationary pressure in Vietnam will directly affect the purchasing power of remittances — money sent from the overseas community will be "thinner" as prices rise.
Remittances and families in Vietnam: In 2024, remittances to Vietnam were estimated at $16-19 billion, a significant portion from the US community. When inflation in the US rises due to energy prices, the disposable income of senders decreases, while recipients in Vietnam need more money because prices are also rising. This is an economic "scissors" cutting from both sides.
Geopolitical perspective: Lessons from history and dangerous comparisons
The current conflict evokes many historical precedents, but does not perfectly match any of them.
The closest comparison is the Tanker War (1984-1988), when Iran and Iraq attacked each other's oil tankers and those of third countries during the Iran-Iraq War. Then, the US deployed Operation Earnest Will to escort Kuwaiti ships, and the conflict escalated until the US Navy shot down Iran Air 655 in 1988. This time, France has proposed a purely defensive escort mission to protect ships after the "hottest phase" of the conflict — but Pakistan has moved ahead with its own naval escort plan, showing each country is protecting its interests without waiting for a multilateral framework.
A more concerning comparison: NATO's deployment of Patriot air defense systems in central Turkey after two ballistic missiles were intercepted in Turkish airspace. This means the war has spread to NATO's border — a scenario considered "fanciful" just months ago. If an Iranian missile hits Turkish territory, would NATO's Article 5 (an attack on one is an attack on all) be triggered? This question is currently on every European foreign ministry's desk.
For Vietnam and Southeast Asia, the Gulf crisis raises larger strategic questions. Hanoi depends significantly on oil imports from the Middle East, and any prolonged disruption will affect national energy security. Simultaneously, as the US concentrates military resources in the Middle East, questions about Washington's commitment to security in the South China Sea resurface. Beijing is certainly watching very carefully.
Expanding proxy war: Iraq, Lebanon and the risk of regional "wildfire
Four fighters from the Kataeb Imam Ali militia — an Iran-backed militia force in Iraq — were killed in airstrikes in Kirkuk province, northern Iraq. This is not an isolated event. Iran's proxy force network extends from Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria, Iraq (Hashd al-Shaabi groups), Yemen (Houthis), to Bahrain and Gaza. When the "brain" in Tehran is attacked, these "branches" do not dissolve — they automate and escalate.
Israel has launched new airstrikes on Lebanon, showing the northern front remains active. This is the multi-front war scenario that Israeli military planners once called "war on all fronts" — and it is happening.
Financial markets and investment psychology: Opportunity or trap?
With Vietnamese-Americans increasingly active in investments — from stocks to real estate — current volatility presents complex choices. Asian stock markets recovered after Trump's statement, but this recovery is based on the assumption that the war will end soon — an assumption both Iran and Israel reject.
Energy and defense stocks surged, but history shows that "chasing" wartime stocks often carries high risk because price volatility depends on unexpected events no one can predict. Conversely, if the crisis drags on, the Federal Reserve will face a dilemma: raise interest rates to curb inflation (due to energy prices) or lower rates to support the economy? Stagflation — high inflation combined with low growth — is a returning specter.
For Vietnamese families with mortgages, interest rate volatility will directly impact monthly payments if they have floating-rate loans. For those running import businesses from Vietnam, shipping costs for containers across sea routes are skyrocketing.
Who benefits, who loses?
In every crisis, there are always winners and losers.
Short-term beneficiaries: Russia (exempted from sanctions, selling oil at high prices), US oil and gas companies (rising domestic oil prices), defense industry (new weapons contracts).
Heavy losers: Net energy-importing countries (including Vietnam, India, Japan, South Korea), global consumers (inflation), and the Iranian people themselves — targets of both Western bombs and the incompetent rule of a theocratic regime.
Notably, Egypt has raised fuel prices up to 30% — a move that could cause social unrest in the world's most populous Arab country. If a "Second Arab Spring" erupts over bread prices rising due to oil costs, the geopolitical consequences will far exceed any current calculations.
Conclusion: The road ahead and what the community needs to monitor
The US-Israel-Iran war is at its most dangerous point: both sides claim they will win, both reject de-escalation, and the "diplomatic buffer" has been destroyed as Araghchi declared negotiations closed. No international mechanism — not the UN, not Omani or Qatari mediators — is positioned to intervene effectively.
For the Vietnamese-American community, key things to monitor closely in the coming weeks:
- Gas prices in the US: If they exceed $5/gallon in California, the impact on small businesses will be very evident.
- Fed response: Any signals about interest rate policy will affect mortgages and business borrowing costs.
- Shipping situation: Cost of containers from Vietnam to the US — if they increase sharply, import goods prices will escalate.
- VND/USD exchange rate: Depreciation pressure on the Vietnamese dong will affect remittance value.
- China's response in the South China Sea: As Washington is preoccupied in the Middle East, Beijing may increase pressure in the region.
We at Saigon Sentinel do not believe this war will "end soon" as Trump claims. When both sides view de-escalation as surrender, and when leaders' words have blocked every diplomatic exit, the most likely scenario is a prolonged conflict at medium intensity — not total war, but enough to keep oil above $90/barrel for many months and cause global economic instability.
This is not a distant, irrelevant war. Every additional dollar on the price of a barrel of oil is a dollar less in the pockets of every family — whether in Tehran, Houston, or Saigon.