Approximately 40% of global crude oil traded passes through the Strait of Hormuz, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). If this shipping lane were blocked — even for just a few weeks — Southeast Asian economies would feel the shock before any government could call an emergency meeting. This is not theory. It is a lesson that the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur last week reiterated, when regional leaders discussed a mechanism for shared fuel and food reserves — an idea that sounds practical, but contains far more contradictions than what the joint statement revealed.
ASEAN has yet to reach an agreement on the level of collective response when economic interests are threatened from outside the region.
Context: Why discuss this now?
Escalating conflict in the Middle East — particularly attacks that Iran has carried out targeting Gulf states, according to the joint ASEAN statement released on May 10, 2026 — has raised a question the bloc has long avoided: How dependent is Southeast Asia on an oil route it cannot control?
The short answer: very much. According to data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) released in 2024, approximately 85% of oil imports for Northeast and Southeast Asian countries pass through the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca — two geographic chokepoints that both lie outside ASEAN's direct sphere of influence. The Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia — the four largest economies in the bloc — all depend significantly on oil imports from the Middle East.
Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., after the summit, spoke bluntly: "When a war happens and a trade route like the Strait of Hormuz gets closed — we need to have somewhere to run to immediately to get emergency supplies." This is a rare statement in its pragmatism: no diplomatic language, no evasion. Marcos acknowledged that ASEAN currently has no such "place to run to.
Shared reserves mechanism: A good idea, difficult to implement
The proposal for a shared fuel "reservoir" — terminology that Marcos used — is not entirely new. ASEAN has had the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement (APAEC) since 1986, which has been amended and expanded multiple times, most recently the APAEC Action Plan for 2021 to 2025. But this mechanism operates mainly on paper and has never been activated during a genuine crisis.
The structural problem is this: ASEAN countries have uneven demand and supply profiles. As Marcos pointed out, some countries have a surplus of one type of fuel while others face shortages. Indonesia and Malaysia are the region's major oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters. Brunei exports LNG. In contrast, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore depend more heavily on imports of crude oil and refined products.
A genuine sharing mechanism would require:
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Real-time inventory and monitoring systems
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Price agreements in crisis situations — something no country wants to commit to in advance
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Cross-border storage and transport infrastructure
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An arbitration mechanism when disputes arise over access priorities
None of these are mentioned in the joint statement. This is the gap between summit diplomacy and substantive policy.
Joint statement: What was omitted is as important as what was written
The draft joint statement — according to AP reporting before the summit — was expected to include a specific "contingency plan" to protect maritime freedom of navigation and international law against Middle East conflict. The final version did not include this section.
Instead, the statement merely "reaffirms the importance of freedom of navigation" under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — familiar diplomatic language with no binding force. ASEAN also named Israel, the United States, and Iran in expressing concerns — a relatively strong move rhetorically for a bloc that prioritizes consensus and avoids direct confrontation.
But the removal of the "contingency plan" from the final statement reveals something more important: ASEAN still has not reached agreement on the level of collective response when external economic interests are threatened. Some members — particularly countries with deep trade and investment ties with either the United States or Iran — will be cautious of any language that might be seen as taking sides.
Vietnam in the equation
For Vietnam, the story of fuel and food in crisis is not just a macroeconomic issue — it affects directly the production chains that millions of domestic workers depend on.
Vietnam is currently one of the world's largest rice exporters, according to 2024 data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). On fuel, the Nghi Son and Binh Son oil refineries meet part of domestic demand — but Vietnam still imports crude oil and refined petroleum products at significant levels, according to reports from the Vietnam Petroleum Corporation (PVN).
In this context, Hanoi has practical reasons to support an ASEAN shared reserves mechanism — particularly the portion related to food, where Vietnam can play the role of supplier rather than just recipient. But on fuel, Vietnam will be cautious of any commitment that would oblige the country to share strategic oil reserves while lacking clear replenishment guarantees.
Perspective from Vietnamese communities in the United States
For Vietnamese communities in the United States — particularly in centers like Little Saigon in Orange County, California; Houston, Texas; and San Jose, California — developments in the Middle East and instability in global energy supply are not abstract matters.
Many Vietnamese American families maintain steady remittance flows to Vietnam. According to World Bank data from 2024, Vietnam receives approximately 16 billion USD in remittances annually, with the United States as the largest source. When gasoline prices in the United States rise due to Middle East instability — and when inflation erodes the incomes of immigrant workers — the actual amount of remittances sent back could decline, even if nominal figures remain unchanged.
Moreover, Vietnamese American entrepreneurs in the restaurant and food business — a large community in all three cities mentioned — will feel direct pressure from food supply chains if shipping costs increase due to disruption of sea routes. Import costs for spices, frozen seafood, and raw materials from Southeast Asia are all calculated based on oil prices.
Geopolitics: Where does ASEAN stand?
This is the most complex point. ASEAN has long operated under the principles of "non-interference in internal affairs" and "absolute consensus" — meaning every joint statement reflects the lowest common denominator among all 10 members, not the strongest positions.
In the current Middle East conflict, at least two forces divide the bloc:
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Relations with Iran: Malaysia and Indonesia — ASEAN's two countries with the largest Muslim populations — have diplomatic and trade relations with Iran, making them cautious of language that criticizes Tehran too strongly.
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Relations with the United States and Israel: The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have tighter economic and defense relations with Washington, and thus are less inclined to oppose U.S. positions in the region.
The fact that the joint statement named all three parties — Israel, the United States, and Iran — is a deliberate choice, aimed at maintaining a neutral appearance while still "signaling concern" to each party. But signals without accompanying action are merely ceremonial diplomacy.
Compared to the International Energy Agency (IEA) — where members commit to releasing strategic oil reserves within 90 days when crisis occurs, with clear activation and monitoring mechanisms — ASEAN's "reservoir" proposal remains at the preliminary idea stage. ASEAN is not the IEA, and lacks the institutional capacity to become one in the near term.
Prospects: Small chances, but real
Pessimistic commentary on ASEAN's capacity for action does not mean nothing will happen. There are at least two reasons to believe this time could be different:
- First, this is the first time in many years that language about "shared reserves" has appeared at the level of heads of state and government, not just energy ministers. This elevates the political weight of the issue.
- Second, supply chain disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict have made many Southeast Asian governments genuinely change their perception of energy and food security. This is no longer academic theory.
- However, the greatest risk is not lack of will — it is lack of mechanism. Without a dedicated technical secretariat, without committed funding sources, and without a specific roadmap from the recent summit, Marcos's "reservoir" may remain merely a diplomatic metaphor until the next summit.
Conclusion: Hormuz is the test, ASEAN has no answer yet
What the ASEAN summit last week truly revealed is not unity — but the gap between risk perception and collective action capacity. Southeast Asia understands clearly how vulnerable it is to an oil route thousands of kilometers away. But understanding and preparing are two different things.
For Vietnamese communities in the United States, these instabilities are not abstract geopolitical news — they connect directly to prices, remittances, and the livelihoods of families still in Vietnam. Each time oil prices spike, each time shipping routes are disrupted, that burden ultimately falls on those least able to protect themselves.
ASEAN may not do anything wrong at this summit. But the right question is not whether ASEAN speaks correctly — it is whether ASEAN acts in time, when the Strait of Hormuz truly closes.